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DAVID WEISSBORD AND PAULMCGREAL 
ABSTRACT 
INLIGHT OFTHE WAVE of attacks on constitutional freedoms and rights 
in the 1980s, i t  is perhaps an opportune moment to reflect on the 
arguments offered in support of broad discretion granted to local 
school boards in determining the contents of school library shelves. 
Students, especially those in secondary school, are guaranteed 
constitutional rights; those rights, however, are balanced against the 
competing interests of a community in general or a school board 
in particular. In this article we will examine this balance as it has 
been struck in the courts and we will argue that a more enlightened 
conception of community interest would involve narrower discretion 
in school board and community actions. 
INTRODUCTION 
There are three ways in which the government may manipulate 
a library’s holdings. First, a librarian, school board, or local 
government can create a biased literary selection in its libraries 
through the systematic addition of books catering to a particular 
ideological perspective (hereinafter referred to as the “addition 
problem”). Through careful forethought, government can prevent 
politically and socially “incorrect” ideas from entering libraries in 
the first place, hence avoiding the need to engage in noticeable and 
controversial removal of those books at a later date. The industrious 
government censor can avoid public clamor against the librarian’s 
actions if he/she can plan ahead and carefully screen books he/she 
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finds objectionable. The efficient censors are thus rewarded for their 
efforts with little or no public opposition. (The conscientious censor 
has also been rewarded by the United States Supreme Court. In Board 
of Education u. Pico, Associate Justice Brennan stated that the 
addtion of books to libraries did not present constitutional problems 
as did the removal of books from libraries. For an article that shows 
the logical inconsistency of Brennan’s position see Van Gee1 [1983]. 
“The Search for Constitutional Limits On Governmental Authority 
to Inculcate Youth.”) The addtion problem-because it occurs 
continuously, gradually, and covertly-poses an insidious threat to 
our libraries and liberties. 
A second type of manipulation is the labeling of books and other 
library material by the government (hereafter referred to as the 
“labeling problem”). The labeling problem occurs when the 
government attempts to characterize the content of a book or issues 
a warning with regard to its subject matter. By labeling such material, 
the government maintains the appearance of noncensorship since 
the material remains available to the public, while sending a message 
that the public interprets as official disapproval. (An example of such 
government action is the Foreign Agents Registration Act [FARA] 
which allows the Department of Justice to label some foreign material 
entering the United States as “political propaganda.” What FARA 
in fact does is to allow the government to place a non-neutral label 
on foreign films entering the United States. The label of political 
propaganda is to be given to all foreign films “reasonably adapted 
to ...p revail upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce, or in any way 
influence a recipient or any section of the public ...with reference 
to the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a foreign 
government or political party or foreign policy of the United States” 
[Tribe, 19881. In popular usage, “propaganda” has a much more 
negative connotation than the standard in FARA. Lawrence Tribe 
of Harvard Law School finds FARAs labeling provision troublesome 
because “the word ‘propaganda’ has long been an explosive, value- 
laden term with such pejorative connotations that the registration 
process necessarily does more than simply label the source of a film 
of foreign origin; rather, i t  almost certainly discourages audiences 
from viewing the film by branding tit as a product of half-truths 
and distortions” [p. 8101. The FARA label stigmatizes a work with 
an apparent mark of official government disapproval.) 
A third type of manipulation is the removal of books from library 
shelves (hereafter referred to as the “removal problem”). Selective 
addition and removal can be differentiated on the basis of the effect 
they have on public attitudes. With removal, the public knows what 
material has been removed because the government’s actions are 
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affirmative and overt. The result is that specific material (the removed 
material) is branded with the official stamp of government 
disapproval. Thus the full effect of removal may be to close off a 
large segment of the population from the removed material. The 
perceived evils of the material may generate the attitude either: 
(1) that the government would not have removed the material if i t  
was worth reading, or (2)that since the government does not approve 
of the book, I should not read it, even if I want to: if I do read 
it I might be labeled subversive or anti-American. While some 
educated adults may be able to assess critically and reject the 
government’s actions, impressionable children and less informed/ 
concerned individuals may uncritically accept the government’s 
assessment of the removed material. 
Selective addition, on the other hand, works no such broad 
slanting of public perception. The public still has access to the 
material not selectively added; however, there is no longer the stigma 
of seeking material banned by the government as there is with the 
removal problem. We believe that removal poses a greater magnitude 
of harm because it  carries the added threat of a de facto complete 
removal of the material that is not a danger with selective adhtion. 
Some instances of removal, or what is in many cases outright 
banning, of books have culminated in landmark legal cases. Some 
of these cases provide an excellent starting point and context for 
an extended analysis of the rather uneasy balance struck between 
community interest and individual liberty. These cases raise 
fundamental questions concerning the very nature and function of 
school libraries in our society and they help to more clearly define 
the role of school libraries in maintaining a fully functioning 
representative democracy with an electorate capable of full and 
meaningful political participation. 
THECASES 
In Evans u.Selma U n i o n  High School (Bosmajian, 1983, pp. 
3-5), the California State Supreme Court decided that a high school 
district was permitted to purchase twelve copies of the Bible in the 
King James version for the Selma Union High School Library. The 
plaintiff claimed that the King James version of the Bible is a book 
of sectarian character and, as such, should not be purchased for the 
library of a public school. It was argued that purchase of i t  would 
be contrary to constitutional provisions against discrimination or 
preference and against public aid of any religious sect, church, or 
creed. And i t  was argued that such purchase would be contrary to 
statutory provisions in the state prohibiting use, or distribution, of 
any publication of a sectarian, partisan, or denominational character. 
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The court argued, however, that the King James version of the Bible 
was not sectarian but was, instead, a “widely accepted translation 
of the Bible,” a “recognized classic” of literature (p. 4). More 
important, the court noted the following: “The mere act of purchasing 
a book to be added to the school library does not carry with ii any 
implication of the adoption of the theory or dogma contained therein, 
or any approval of the book itself, except as a work of literature 
fit to be included in a reference library” (p. 5). This work’s classic 
stature and widespread approval and readership were taken as 
sufficient evidence of what constitutes “fitness” or “appropriateness.” 
In subsequent cases, we see less consensus on the question of a book’s 
status and a corresponding argument to prevent a book’s appearance 
on library shelves. 
In Rosenberg v. Board of Education of City of New York 
(Bosmajian, 1983, p. 5), the New York Supreme Court decided that 
Oliver Twist and T h e  Merchant of Venice cannot be banned from 
New York City schools, libraries, or classrooms. There were three 
main grounds adduced for the ruling: (1) there is a “public interest 
in a free and democratic society [based upon free inquiry and learning 
that] does not warrant or encourage the suppression of any book 
at the whim of any unduly sensitive person or group of persons, 
merely because a character described in such book as belonging to 
a particular race or religion is portrayed in a derogatory or offensive 
manner” (p. 5). The exception noted is when a book is written 
maliciously with the purpose of promoting “bigoted hatred” against 
a particular racial or religious group. (2) If evaluation of any literary 
work were based on a requirement that i t  be free from derogatory 
reference to any religion, race, and so on, endless litigation would 
probably ensue. (3) Censorship and suppression are not particularly 
effective at removing religious and racial intolerance; in fact, they 
may lead instead to “misguided readings and unwarranted inferences” 
(p. 5). Arguing that there was no “substantial reason” which would 
compel the suppression of the two books, the court found that the 
Board of Education acted in the best interests of the school system. 
What constitutes an “unduly sensitive person” is left unclear, 
as is what would constitute a “whim” of such a person. When does 
a whim become a good argument? When does an unduly sensitive 
person become a reasonably tolerant but reasonably offended one? 
How does one determine authorial intent to malign? Should intent 
be necessary, or could we reasonably point to consequences (i.e., to 
the fact that persons are maligned)? These are questions that become 
central in subsequent cases. 
In President’s Council u. Community  School Board (1972), we 
see the convening of the first federal court ever to adjudicate the 
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conflicting claims of high school students and a local school board. 
The case concerns the removal by a school board of Down These 
Mean Streets, a novel by Piri Thomas in which there is a violent 
and ugly depiction of a Puerto Rican youth growing up  in the East 
Side barrio of New York City. There are descriptions of criminal 
violence, sex, and drug shooting; the presumed educational value 
of the work (in this educational setting) is to acquaint the 
predominantly white, middle-class junior high school students of 
Queens with the harsh life in Spanish Harlem (Bosmajian, 1983, 
p. 18). The school board removed the book in light of complaints 
from parents that the vulgar language and explicit sexual descriptions 
in the book would have an adverse moral and psychological effect 
on eleven- to fif  teen-year-old children. The plaintiffs (parents, 
teachers, and children) challenged this action in federal district court 
claiming that there was a violation of their First Amendment rights 
and arguing that the book was valuable educationally and had no 
adverse effect on the development of the children. The court rejected 
the plaintiffs’ claims and asserted that the school board had acted 
permissibly. The court reasoned that the board had not prohibited 
the book’s discussion in class, parents could borrow the book for 
their children, and there was only a “miniscule” intrusion of the 
board on any First Amendment constitutional right (Bosmajian, 1983, 
p. 19). The issues in this case are complex and space does not allow 
a detailed comment. Some of the claims made in various petitions 
for a writ of certiorari are noteworthy-although the writ was denied. 
It is to those claims we now turn. 
SOME SALIENT REASONS FOR AND OFFERED 
AGAINSTGRANTINGTHE WRIT 
1. The U.S. Supreme Court ought to decide to what extent school 
professionals should be at the mercy of politically responsible lay 
boards of education in determining what their students may read, 
learn, and have access to in the schools. 
2. 	Parents, students, and professionals ought to be able to rely on 
the judiciary when school libraries are stripped of politically 
disfavored books by a shifting majority of the school board. 
3. 	The federal courts ought to prevent our nation’s schools from 
becoming instruments of majoritarian propaganda. 
4. Constitutional principles of academic freedom limit the power 
of school boards even over allegedly educational matters. 
5.  	The removal of the book deprived students of their First 
Amendment right to know. 
6. 	The students claim no unqualified First Amendment right of access 
to books but make, instead, three claims: (a) they no longer have 
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access to a book previously available to them; (b) their right to 
know has been impaired; and (c) there is no compelling state 
interest justifying that impairment (pp. 21-24). The unlimited 
power of selection or banning gives the transitory majority of 
a board great opportunities to impose their personal, social, and 
political views on the teachers and public of the school district. 
Dissenting from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to deny 
certiorari, Justice Douglas wrote: 
What else can the School Board now decide it does not like? How else 
will its sensibilities be offended? Are we sending children to school to 
be educated by the norms of the School Board or are we educating our 
youth to shed the prejudires of the past, to explore all forms of thought, 
and to find solutions to our world’s problems? (Bosmajian, 1983, p. 35) 
There were fascinating arguments presented in a brief in opposition 
to the petition for certiorari. Some main points included the 
following: 
1. The power of selection of books for educational purposes must 
include the “power to choose between books and to exclude those 
which are found inadequate, irrelevant, or otherwise inappropriate 
for the particular children to be served, and not merely the power 
to exclude those books which have been held to be illegal for 
sale to minors” (Bosmajian, 1983, p. 26). 
2. 	The limitation to the librarian’s right to choose the selection of 
books does not violate the librarian’s professional freedom, as the 
library remained in possession of the book and she may lend it  
to parents who request it. 
3. “That a parent may disagree with that [librarian’s right to choose] 
does not give him a constitutional right to compel the purchase 
or retention of any particular book, or to compel that i t  be available 
directly to students rather than to their parents” (Bosmajian, 1983, 
p. 27). 
4. The students have not been deprived of any “right to know.” 
There has been no ban on the discussion of any field of study. 
5. 	The age of the children (eleven to fifteen) is sufficiently immature 
to warrant some limitation on the kind of books made freely 
available to them (p. 27). 
Minarcini u. Strongsville City School Dist.(Bosmajian, 1983, pp. 
43-47) presents the case of a school board removing Kurt Vonnegut’s 
Cut’s Cradle and Joseph Heller’s Catch-22 from the school library 
against the faculty recommendation that authorized them as library 
books or textbooks. Further, the board passed resolutions limiting 
discussions of the books in class and their use as supplementary 
reading. 
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After a trial in district court, the judge dismissed Minarcini’s 
original complaint finding that the school board’s actions had not 
violated rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
The case was then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth 
Circuit. 
The court of appeals sided with the high school students, 
invoking concepts of academic freedom and a First Amendment right 
to know and, correspondingly, to have access to information. The 
students, then, could establish a prima facie constitutional violation 
upon the removal of a book from the school library. 
The court’s discussion of the book banning issue contained 
critical factual information. First, both Minarcini and the school 
district agreed that the banned books were of some “literary value” 
and that none of those books contained “obscenity as defined in 
the Supreme Court’s cases (Miller u. California, 1973). (The Supreme 
Court announced its obscenity standard in the 1973 case Miller u. 
California, 413 U.S. 15: “The basic guidelines for the trier of fact 
must be: (a) whether the ‘average person, applying contemporary 
community standards’ would find that the work, taken as a whole, 
appeals to the prurient interest, . . ; (b) whether the work depicts 
or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically 
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken 
as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” 
Thus, by conceding that the banned books were of literary value, 
the school district also admitted that the material was not  obscene 
under (c) of the Miller standard.) With these admissions, the court 
had to look in the minutes of the school board’s meeting concerning 
the offending books to find the motivation behind the district’s 
actions. The minutes reflected the school board’s judgment that 
Vonnegut’s writing was “completely sick,” and that the book was 
“written by the same character (Vennegutter) who wrote, using the 
term loosely, God Bless You Mr. Rosewater.” The court concluded 
from these statements that “the School Board removed the books 
because it  found them objectionable in content” (Bosmajian, 1983, 
p. 45). 
Minarcini highlights the conflict that arises in any instance of 
the removal problem: the student’s interest in receiving continued 
exposure to a variety of literary materials is pitted against the 
government’s interest in providing a “proper” education. Each side 
deserves some weight. The pivotal task in evaluating the removal 
problem is to strike the correct balance between student and 
government interests. In the Minarcini case, the school board found 
the banned material to be “objectionable.” In striking a balance, 
we need to examine the substantive content of this “objectionable” 
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standard (e.g., social mores, community values, national standards, 
individual preferences) as well as what variety is sufficient to protect 
students from a “pall of orthodoxy” in school curricula. (Associate 
Justice William Rehnquist of the United States Supreme Court, in 
his dissent in Board of Education v. Pico, infra. [the next removal 
problem case we will look at], used the phrase “pall of orthodoxy” 
to describe the educational atmosphere the government would have 
to create in order for him to feel that students’ interests were being 
harmed.) Further analysis of the student government conflict will 
be delayed until after we review the issues in the first removal problem 
case to come before the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School Dist. v. 
Pic0 (Bosmajian, 1983, pp. 93-118), arose from the attempt by a local 
New York school board to remove books from the shelves of high 
school and junior high school libraries. Several members of the school 
board had attended a conference sponsored by Parents of New York 
United (PONY-U) where they received a list of books that school 
board members described as “objectionable” and “improper fare for 
school students” [emphasis added]. (Associate Justice Brennan’s 
majority opinion in Pic0 described PONY-U as “a politically 
conservative organization of parents concerned about education 
legislation in the State of New York” [Bosmajian, 1983, p. 941). 
However, the school board did “concede that the books [on the PONY- 
U list] are not obscene” (Pico v.Board of Education, 479 F. Supp. 
387, 392 [EDNY 19791). Nine of the books on the PONY-U list were 
found in the Island Trees High School. (The nine books in the high 
school library were: Slaughterhouse-Five by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.; T h e  
Naked Ape  by Desmond Morris; Down These Mean Streets by Piri 
Thomas; Best Short Stories of Negro Writers edited by Langston 
Hughes; Go Ask Alice of anonymous authorship; Laughing Boy by 
Oliver LaFarge; Black Boy by Richard Wright; A Hero Ain’t Nothin’ 
But a Sandwich by Alice Childress; and Soul on Ice by Eldridge 
Cleaver.) After appointing a committee to recommend to the board 
whether the books on the PONY-U list should be retained, taking 
into account the books’ “ ‘educational suitability,’ ‘good taste,’ 
‘relevance,’ and appropriateness to age and grade level” (Picov.Board 
of Education, 1979, at 857), the school board ignored the committee’s 
recommendation to keep five of the books and ordered all nine books 
removed from school shelves. (Of the other four books, the committee 
recommended that one “be made available to students only with 
parental approval” [Pico u.Board of Education, 1979, at 8581. The 
recommendation of a parental approval condition on book circulation 
can be considered a form of governmental labeling of books.) In 
removing the books, the school board described them as “anti-American, 
WEISSBORD & MCGREAL/THE ENLIGHTENED COMMUNITY 59 
anti-Christian, anti-Semetic [sic], and just plain filthy,” and justified 
their actions by claiming that “it is our [the school board’s] duty, 
our moral obligation, to protect the children in our schools from 
this moral danger as surely as from physical and medical dangers” 
(Pico v .  Board of Education, 1979, Supp. 387, 390 [emphasis 
added]). 
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled, in a confusing plurality opinion, 
that school boards could not remove disfavored books from school 
libraries with “absolute discretion.” The Court, while embracing the 
notion that school boards have a substantial legitimate role to play 
in the determination of school library content, argued that boards 
could not play that role if they did so in a “narrowly partisan or 
political manner” (Bosmajian, 1983, p. 98). The key for the Court 
was in determining the motivation behind the school board’s actions. 
If the board’s intent is to deny students access to ideas with which 
the members of the board disagreed, and if the intent is the decisive 
factor in the board’s decision, then and only then does the board 
violate First Amendment rights of the students. The rationale seems 
to be based on an aversion to “prescribed orthodoxy.” Permitted 
censorship would involve books “pervasively vulgar” or educationally 
unsuitable, not books thought inimical to the board’s moral, political, 
religious, or social taste. (This case did not affect the addition or 
labeling of books but rather concerned solely their removal.) 
The tension between student and governmental interests in 
Minarcini are equally present in Pico. The books in both cases were 
no t  claimed to be obscene (and thus not automatically denied the 
protections of free speech) but only found “objectionable” by the 
members of the school board. The delicate balance implicated in 
Pic0 concerns the extent to which the school board may follow its 
desire to “protect the children in our schools” from “objectionable” 
material before such efforts begin to suppress access to ideas to which 
students have a right. In striking this balance it will again be necessary 
to discuss various interpretations of “objectionable” material, an 
understanding of which will help to delimit the proper boundaries 
of the government’s discretion in cases of the removal problem. (Of 
course this definition will also carry implications for the addition 
problem and the labeling problem, as will be seen later.) 
IMPLICATIONSOF SCHOOL BOOK BANNINGS 
We can learn a lot from the way in which the Pic0 and Minarcini 
courts handled their respective cases. These two cases placed much 
emphasis on the fact that book bannings in school libraries implicate 
questions of education. The courts that have grappled with the 
removal problem have recognized the importance of such libraries 
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to education when they described a school library as a “storehouse 
of knowledge,” “a mighty resource in the free marketplace of ideas,” 
and a place where “a student can literally explore the unknown, 
and discover areas of interest and thought not covered by the prescribed 
curriculum ....Th[e] student learns that a library is a place to test 
or expand upon ideas presented to him, in or out of the classroom” 
(as cited in Minarcini u. Strongsuille School District [Bosmajian, 1983, 
pp. 43-47]). 
School libraries represent a relatively voluntary, informal forum 
(as opposed to the compulsion involved in normal class work) in 
which students may continue their education by seeking out material 
suggested implicitly or explicitly by their formal education. (The 
Minarcini court recognized a function similar to this for libraries 
when it stated that a teacher has a right to express an opinion about 
a book in class and that there exists a corresponding right on the 
part of the student “to hear [the teacher] and to find and read the 
book” [Minarcini,  supra at 5821.) Schools should teach their students 
how to use those “storehouses of knowledge” so that they can expand 
their horizons through independent exploration of library material 
long after the structure of the classroom is gone. If government and 
schools are allowed to manipulate the contents of school libraries 
at will, then students are sent a message that libraries exist solely 
to provide books essential to the immediate educational function of 
their school libraries, and that libraries are not  for after school 
exploration and experimentation. Thus school libraries appear to 
serve a dual function: (1) to provide easy access to materials that 
will supplement students’ immediate education, and (2) to teach 
students how to pursue reading material on their own so that they 
do not feel that a library’s usefulness ends with their formal education 
but, rather, that libraries should serve as one of the foci of their 
ongoing informal education. 
But what should the contents of these libraries be? The foregoing 
suggests that the contents should bear some relationship to the 
mission of education. We shall limit our consideration to a brief 
discussion of the function of education, and thus libraries, as it relates 
to our nation’s commitment to a democratic form of government. 
Education plays a large role in shaping informed citizens. The 
U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized the importance of education 
to the proper functioning of our government. (See e.g., Meyer u. 
Nebraska, 282 U.S. 390, 1923. [“education and the acquisition of 
knowledge as matters of supreme importance”]; A bington SchooZ 
District u. Schempp,  374 U.S. 203, 1963 [“the public schools as a 
most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system 
of government”]; Ambach  u.Norwick,  441 U.S. 68, 1789 [as a way 
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of communicating “the values on which our society rests”]; and 
Wisconsin u. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 1972 [“necessary to prepare citizens 
to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system 
if we are to preserve freedom and independence”].) Without education 
we lack the tools to make use of the choices a representative 
government presents. 
A humanistic education provides an understanding of the 
tradtions and cultures that make up our society, an understanding 
that is crucial to making informed choices in the political arena. 
Essential to a humanistic education are many materials widely 
available to the public only through the country’s libraries. By 
allowing the unfettered removal of such material from our libraries 
we risk an overwinnowing of our libraries and the creation of an 
uneducated, uninformed electorate. If such an electorate were to 
emerge, we would need to fear the decisions of the majority more 
than before, because such decisions would be uninformed and 
uneducated. If such majority decisions became the rule, we would 
have to fear the very majority rule that forms the basis of our 
democratic governmental system. Thus libraries and their role in 
education are critical to the functioning of our government and society 
(McGreal, 1989). (Some of this analysis draws directly from McGreal, 
P. [1989], “‘I Don’t Recall Senator,’ A Critical Analysis of Robert 
Bork’s Neutral Principles Theory” [unpublished manuscript].) 
Our emphasis on providing a broad humanistic education for 
American citizens leads us to object strongly to any removal that 
does not arise from a desire to keep obscene material from younger 
children. The school boards in the Minarcini and Pic0 cases obviously 
felt differently. Both school boards cited a number of different criteria 
for what they felt were “objectionable” books, while agreeing that 
the books in question were not obscene. An analysis of these boards’ 
motivations and goals, as well as the implications of their actions, 
is necessary to understand the harm their actions can inflict on youth. 
We agree with Justice Brennan’s statement in Pic0 that education 
in all its forms is “vitally important ‘in the preparation of individuals 
for participation as citizens’ ” (Pico v. Board of Education, 1979, at 
864). However, agreement ends with Brennan’s next statement that 
such “preparation” includes ‘ “inculcating fundamental values 
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system’ ” (Pico 
u. Board of Education, 1979, quoting Ambach v. Norwick), and that 
such values include “community values” as well as “respect for 
authority and traditional values be they social, moral, or political” 
(Pzco u. Board of Education, 1979, quoting Brief for Petitioners). 
Where we advocate a broad, humanistic education for the proper 
preparation of informed citizens, Brennan argues that each 
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community must be allowed to inculcate students with its own values 
in order to promote democracy. And, of course, Brennan’s narrower 
view of education implies a narrower selection of material to 
supplement that education in our libraries. 
Other than citing Supreme Court precedent, Brennan offers little 
or no argument in support of his finding that community values 
are the proper subject of primary and secondary education. But we 
need not end the discussion with Brennan’s silence. Patrick Devlin 
(1959) takes up the subject in his article “Morals and the Criminal 
Law.” 
Devlin’s “Morals and the Criminal Law” was written mainly 
as a reply to the Wolfenden Report, also known as the Report of 
the Committee on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution. Devlin 
asks “what part of the moral law should be embodied in the criminal” 
(p. l ) ?  Devlin’s project becomes relevant to our immediate task when 
we rephrase the question as “what part of a community’s morals 
should be embodied in our children’s education?” Keeping the 
rephrased question in mind, we will explore Devlin’s article, searching 
for arguments that support inculcation of community values. 
Devlin’s theory of community is stated very concisely in one 
paragraph. 
society means a community of ideas; without shared ideas on politics, 
morals, and ethics no society can exist. Each one of us has ideas about 
what is good and what is evil; they cannot be kept private from the 
society in which we live. If men and women try to create a society in 
which there is no fundamental agreement about good and evil they will 
fail; if, having based it on common agreement, the agreement goes, the 
society will disintegrate. For society is not something that is kept together 
physically; i t  is held by the invisible bonds of common thought. If the 
bonds were too far released the members would drift apart. A common 
morality is part of the bondage. The bondage is part of the price of 
society; and mankind, which needs society, must pay its price. (p. 10) 
Devlin concludes from the above that “societies disintegrate from 
within more frequently than they are broken u p  by external pressures. 
There is hsintegration when no common morality is observed and 
history shows that the loosening of moral bonds is often the first 
stage of disintegration, so that society is justified in taking the same 
steps to preserve its moral code as it does to preserve its government 
and other essential institutions” (Devlin, 1959, p. 13). Devlin’s theory 
of community reduces to the view that “deviation from a society’s 
shared morality ...[is] capable in [its] nature of threatening the 
existence of society ...” (p. 13n). 
The analogy from Devlin to education becomes apparent when 
we recall the motivation of the school boards in removing books. 
Devlin would probably argue that education, and libraries that serve 
that purpose (and we cannot forget that nonschool libraries serve 
WEISSBORD & MCGREAL/THE ENLIGHTENED COMMUNITY 63 
the important function of informal, continuing self-education), 
should be used to inculcate the community’s shared values lest that 
community loosen its moral bonds and disintegrate from within. 
Under Devlin’s argument, banning books that are “objectionable,” 
or against the community’s shared values, is necessary to the survival 
of the community itself. The marketplace of ideas represented by 
libraries becomes the marketplace of “shared ideas” necessary to 
strengthen the bonds of society. 
One reason we find Devlin’s argument problematic is because 
of an unexplained assumption: that there exist shared ideas of a 
community. Devlin’s assumption is difficult to maintain in a society 
that is irreducibly diverse such as the United States. Perhaps a 
majority’s views ought to be considered the consensus. But such a 
reply assumes the legitimacy of the majority’s authority to make such 
a decision, which is one of the initial questions posed by the removal 
problem. The reply also brings us to Devlin’s contention that 
enforcement of community values is necessary for the continued 
existence of society. 
Also implicated in this critique is Justice Brennan’s assertion 
that “respect for authority and traditional values, be they social, 
moral, or political,” are “fundamental values necessary to the 
maintenance of a democratic political system” (Pic0 u. Board of 
Education, 1979, quoting Ambach u. Norwick and Brief for 
Petitioners). However, Brennan recently upheld the right of 
individuals to burn the flag, an act that would seem to run contrary 
to respect for authority and traditional values. If education has as 
its purpose to foster that respect, then those who burn flags appear 
to have been failed by American education as Brennan conceives it. 
Wouldn’t prohibiting flag burning then also promote the respect 
for authority Brennan sees as so necessary to democracy? Are Brennan’s 
positions in Pic0 and the flag burning case reconcilable on this point? 
It is rather odd that the Constitution would protect conduct (flag 
burning) that works against the values necessary to the maintenance 
of a democratic political system. The above indicates either that flag 
burning .should thus be considered an insidious threat to the 
maintenance of democracy in America, or that an education that 
fosters Brennan’s values is not necessary in maintaining our 
government. 
In his article “The Search for Constitutional Limits on 
Governmental Authority to Inculcate Youth,” Tyll van Gee1 (1983) 
presents convincing empirical and theoretical arguments that refute 
Brennan and Devlin (pp.262-88).In Ambach u. Norwick, the Supreme 
Court cited several studies in support of its assertion that schools 
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properly inculcate students. Interestingly, the relevant portions of 
this work contradict the Court’s finding. For example, Dawson and 
Prewitt (Pic0 u. Board of Education, 1979) argue at one point that: 
It is doubtful ...that basic political loyalties and attachments are 
substantially developed or altered through such formal civic education. 
If the civic training in the curriculum is inconsistent with what is learned 
about the political world from adults, peer groups, and other agents 
of political socialization, i t  may not be very effective. (p. 152) 
One of the Court’s authorities suggests that we should be more 
concerned with setting good examples for our children in the political 
realm than with teaching them what they should do. 
Patrick Devlin’s argument that society is held together by shared 
values is met and turned back by several studies discussed by Van 
Geel. The first study, by Ronald Rogowski, draws from economic 
utility theory. Rogowski argues that a person will choose to support 
the present form of government over alternative forms of government 
only if the present form of government maximizes her expected utility. 
(This notion is consistent with John Rawls’s difference principle, 
according to which social and economic inequalities are just if and 
only if such inequalities give rise to advantages [expected and real] 
of the representative person in the least well-off group in society 
[see Rawls, 19711.) Individuals derive a measure of utility from 
outcomes that they desire. Many favorable outcomes will all have 
positive utility values. 
Under Rogowski’s theory, the cement that holds the bonds of 
society together is expected utility and not shared ideas. The utility 
maximization theory depends on individuals being self-interested 
actors. For such individuals to maximize their expected utility, they 
would have to be within a government that allows the greatest 
probability of (freedom to pursue) their preferred outcomes. 
Rogowski’s theory implies that a community is held together by 
assuring freedom to pursue personal preferred outcomes rather than 
Devlin’s idea of emphasis on shared ideas. 
If freedom is one of the elements that holds society together, 
then we should be concerned about preparing our young to use that 
freedom wisely. For this task, access to varied forms of human discourse 
and ideas is necessary. And this education should begin as early as 
possible. 
SOMETENTATIVECONCLUSIONS 
Students are recognized to have a legitimate claim to First 
Amendment rights. The nation, individual states, local communities, 
and individual school boards are thought to have a legitimate 
indoctrinative interest in permitting, and in some cases encouraging, 
public schools to transmit particular values to its students. Judicially, 
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the problem has been one of developing a coherent doctrine under 
which the various fact patterns could be subsumed. There have been 
commentators who have suggested that this lack of coherence reflected 
a fundamental incompatibility of First Amendment values and the 
values basic to public education; that what was most basic was the 
indoctrinative character of education; and that the U.S. Supreme 
Court ought to recognize the priority of education’s mission whenever 
that mission is to be weighed against First Amendment rights. 
(Tussman [1977] argues that the state has an important “teaching 
power” which involves inducting children into the community, and 
thereby makes notions such as children’s free speech or state 
ideological neutrality irrelevant and condemns the Supreme Court’s 
T i n k e r  and Barnette opinions as “weaken[ing] the tutelary power 
of public authority” [pp. 51-85, 1671. Diamond [1981] argues that 
the Court is wrong in trying to reconcile public education with First 
Amendment values because the school’s indoctrinative functions 
should preclude recognition of children’s first amendment rights. 
Goldstein [ 19761 argues that the scope of permissible state 
indoctrinative interests in public education should preclude any in- 
class expressive activity by teachers that is contrary to the wishes 
of the school authorities [taken from Kamiat, 1982/83, p. 4991.) Other 
commentators, supported in part by the Minarcinz and Pic0 lower 
court decisions, have argued that, in such a conflict, library censorship 
violates a student’s individual right to have access to information 
or that censorship is unjustified given its “chilling effect” on the 
overall in-school expression of students and teachers. 
Proponents on each side of this debate, however, attempt to 
validate their position on the strength of an appeal to an ideal of 
communal self-government. If indeed there is such an (often tacit) 
appeal, the question becomes more readily defined: namely, is 
emphasis on individual rights or community indoctrinative interest 
the best means of attaining the end of communal self government? 
If indeed communal self government is and ought to be the end 
toward which both a healthy respect for fundamental liberties and 
justificatory indoctrinative interest can be invoked, then part of our 
problem is solved. 
This claim, of course, is rather controversial. Many proponents 
of the Bill of Rights adopt a much more individualistic and atomistic 
perspective, arguing that liberties are basic given the nature of the 
individual and her capacities (e.g., a Kantian approach), or that 
fundamental rights ought to be respected given the beneficial 
consequences to the greatest number of individuals over time (a variant 
of rule utilitarianism). Interestingly, though, each approach can be 
employed by those who argue for an ideal form of communal 
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self-government. However, one might remain agnostic on the question 
as to whether Kantian or utilitarian grounds are more justifiably 
invoked to support basic rights so long as the ultimate foundation 
for such rights rests on a vision of communal self-government, moral 
education, and the value of self-direction and respect for various 
conceptions of the good. 
Justice Brennan, in his plurality opinion in Pico, claimed that 
the “public schools are vitally important in the preparation of 
inhviduals for participation as citizens” and, in that very sentence, 
continues by noting that the schools are also important “as vehicles 
for inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of 
a democratic system” (Bosmajian, 1983, p. 95). Here, for the first 
time in these cases, we see judicial recognition of the view that 
participation as citizens and maintenance of a democratic system are 
the basis for evaluating conflicting claims. But, of course, how much 
weight one gives to participation or system can shift the balance 
in these censorship cases. We have seen some ways in which one 
may emphasize one value or the other. The central question to ask 
about this conflict in values is: “to what end participation or system?” 
or “according to what criteria may we resolve this set of conflicting 
values?” 
We would argue that this entire debate ought to be seen in light 
of one fundamental value: moral self-dnection and self-expression. 
Rather than thinking of all values as subordinate to communal self- 
government (Kamiat, 1983), we would suggest all values, including 
communal self-government, should be seen as often a necessary means 
to moral autonomy, responsibility, and expression. (This claim is 
somewhat stronger than that of Rosemarie Tong’s: “To the degree 
that we are able, we are required to take part in governing ourselves. 
We must do so not only because values such as justice, freedom, 
minority rights, and even life itself will be protected only if people 
are vigilant and active, but also because such participation is a form 
of moral self-expression. By thinking and speaking, by deciding and 
acting, we reaffirm that we are morally responsible persons” [Tong, 
1986, p. 1351.) In this way there is a self-sustaining dialectic of civic 
action and participatory community building that would nourish 
freedom and moral equality and create the context within which 
moral self-expression can take place. (The goal, then, would be to 
create a form of political community similar to that sketched by 
Benjamin Barber [1984, chs. 8 8c 91.) 
The main problem, then, rests in deciding how one ought to 
adjudicate the type of conflict evident in the kinds of cases discussed 
earlier. Let’s focus on the Pic0 decision to see how the aforementioned 
considerations could be used in arguing the case for the students. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in Pic0 maintained 
that there are “special characteristics of the school library” that limit 
the state’s pursuit of indoctrinative interests. Such limitations may 
not be evident in curriculum decisions; but the library has a unique 
role to play in providing a context for student freedom “to test or 
expand upon ideas,” for the “fostering [of] individual self- 
expression,” and for “affording public access to discussion, debate, 
and the dissemination of information and ideas” (Bosmajian, 1983, 
pp. 96-99). Now one might argue (as the Court in part does) that 
the above benefits of an unfettered library collection and the general 
access to ideas make “it possible for citizens generally to exercise 
their rights of free speech and press in a meaningful manner” 
(Bosmajian, 1983, p. 97). Or one might argue (as the Court in part 
does) that “such access prepares students for active and effective 
participation in the pluralistic, of ten contentious society in which 
they will soon be adult members” (Bosmajian, 1983, p. 97). The first 
appeal (to the freedom to exercise rights of free speech) is just to 
assume that such rights, if not absolute, should always trump state 
interests. That, however, is to beg the fundamental question at stake 
in these cases and, as such, is an unsatisfactory way to proceed. The 
second appeal (to preparation for active and effective participation 
in a pluralistic and contentious society) is not question begging but 
is, nonetheless, inadequate. For it remains to be shown whether in 
fact an unfettered library collection would best accomplish that goal. 
It would seem equally plausible to assume that the transmission of 
societal values through a careful censorship policy in the schools 
would equally serve the end of “active and effective participation.” 
If, however, we shift the focus away from those two concerns 
to a conception of moral flourishing for which a societal context 
is created, it becomes, or so we would argue, harder to maintain 
that censorship is justified. There is both individual and community 
benefit in respecting each person’s attempt at (moral) self-realization 
and conception of good: individual benefit insofar as individuals are 
given a context in which autonomous moral agency and self-direction 
are viewed as central to moral growth; collective benefit insofar as 
the community is more likely to progress and flourish with morally 
self-realized individuals. Individuals and communities are more likely 
to realize these ends by affording students: (1) exposure to a vast 
range of (of ten competing and potentially subversive) ideas, and 
(2) experience with autonomous choice. Such access to ideas and 
experience with choice are important means to the limited goal of 
communal self-government and are a vital means to the more 
expansive goal of moral self-realization. If the preceding consider- 
ations are compelling, it would follow that future court adjudication 
68 LIBRARY TRENDUSUMMER & FALL 1990 
in school library censorship cases ought to focus more on the value 
of moral development and less on the virtue of participatory 
government. 
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